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JUDGES UINDER FIRE
AU INDEPENDENCE AT ISSUE
Debra Cassens Moss 1
Imagine that you sided with some co-workers who had been
treated unfairly. Soon after your secretary and your parking space are taken
away; you don't get that transfer you requested; and you are the only employee
who doesn't get to attend a training conference in Palm Springs.
Sound fair? Imagine now that you're a judge, and your boss
doesn't like your attempts to protect the judicial independence of those who
work with you.
Critics charge that the hypothetical is all too real at some federal
agenaes and executive departments that employ administrative law judges. Even
worse, they allege, is that in two recent cases the Social Security Administration
and the U.S. Department of the Interior went even further, eliminating the job of
one judge and removing another from his supervisory position.
"Agencies exercise control via different ways," says Nahum Litt,
the chief administrative law judge at the U.S. Department of Labor, who
nonetheless gives his department high marks for judicial independence. He said
the administrators' control methods range from "anything as petty as parking
spaces, adequate secretarial, adequate law derks, facilities, where judges are
housed, how they're housed. A whole litany of small things."
About 1,100 AUs preside over adjudications of 31 federal
agencies and executive departments, deciding, for example, whether the
government wrongly denied social security benefits to applicants. These judges-
who are hired on the basis of experience, recommendations and a written
practice decision-are supposed to be shielded from retaliation for their decisions
under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.
Yet, AUs are subject to more pressures than traditional judges,
says attorney Edward Slavin of the Government Accountability Project in
Washington, D.C., "because they are employed by the agencies whose cases they
decide. Rather than having the independence of a district court judge, they are
essentially on the payroll and subjected to the pressure of the agencies."
1 Debra Cassens Moss a lawyer is the news editor of the ABA Journal. This article first
appeared as the cover story in 77 ABA Journal 56 (November 1991) and is reprinted here with
permission.
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The judge whose job was eliminated, Parlen McKenna, now vice
chair of the National Conference of Administrative Law Judges, daimed in an
appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board in Washington, D.C., that the U.S.
Department of the Interior cut his job in retaliation for his testimony at a
grievance hearing and for his formal petition to Congress.
The action, McKenna alleged, was a prohibited personnel
practice and a violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989. McKenna
v. Department of the Interior, No. DC03519110457.
A hearing on McKenna's complaint began on July 30, 1991,
before an administrative law judge. A decision was expected in late October or
early November.
McKenna alleges Interior eliminated his position as chief
administrative law judge for the Office of Hearings and Appeals because of his
support for the Indian probate judges (IPJs) he supervised, who probate Native
American estates.
The IPJs were objecting to the department's deision to begin
formally appraising their performance. One of their daims was that the ratings
process could be used to influence their probate deisions.
During the IPJs' grievance hearing in November 1989, McKenna
warned that the then-acting director of Interior's Office of Hearings and Appeals,
James Byrnes, had threatened to replace the IPJs if they won their grievance.
McKenna also told the grievance examiner that rating the IPJs
would be a "flagrant waste of money," and that he would need to observe many
of their hearings for the appraisals to be valid.
The grievance officer partially sided with the judges in April
1990, ruling that rt is impossible to evaluate the performance of IPJs without
second-guessing their adjudicatory skills and, indeed, their adjudicatory results."
At the time of the decision, the IPJs were exempted by law
from the requirements and protections of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Congress passed legislation later last year putting the IPJs under the protection of
the act and thereby exempting them from ratings.
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As a result, the secretary of Interior did not rule on the
grievance recommendations.
McKenna had supported the legislation in a petition to
Congress. Byrnes learned of that petition when a copy was faxed to his office
in September 1990 addressed to McKenna. His response was to refer the
improper use of the fax machine to the inspector general for investigation. Using
the fax to circulate the petition, Byrnes contended, was an illegal use of
department funds to lobby Congress.
Despite McKenna's earlier warning, the IPJs kept their jobs. But,
on January 24, McKenna was informed in a letter that he would be "separated"
from his position because the department was implementing a "reduction in
force." The decision, he was told, was the result of a study of the organization
of the Office of Hearings and Appeals by a blue-ribbon committee.
Interior Secretary Manuel Lujan wrote in a letter to the
American Bar Association's National Conference of Administrative Law Judges that
the committee's recommendation to eliminate McKenna's job 'was not personal
in nature and was not directed at the incumbent or any individual."
The major reason for the cut, Interior says in its response to
McKenna's appeal, was that McKenna would no longer be required to rate the
IPJs' performance since they were converted to AUs.
In an unsuccessful petition to intervene in McKenna's case,
seven Indian probate judges daimed that the findings of the blue-ribbon
committee, of which McKenna was a member, were manipulated to justify the
job cut.
They say McKenna's workload was not reduced because he had
never rated the IPJs in the past.
McKenna refused comment on his hearing, but some other
AUs agree there is a connection between McKenna's testimony and the
reduction in force. 'We do operate in a wholly vindictive and retaliatory
environment," says one AU who is employed by the Department of the Interior.
"McKenna threatened the political status quo at the agency and lost."
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Judge Frands O'Byrne didn't testify in a grievance hearing, but
one AU who worked for him in the Chicago South hearings office of the Socal
Security Administration did testify before Congress. About three months after the
June 13, 1990, hearing held by the House Subcommittee on Social Security,
O'Byrne was removed as chief administrative law judge.
Ironically, the hearing concerned judidal independence for AUs.
The subcommittee now is investigating whether the SSA, which employs more
than 700 AUs, retaliated against O'Byrne for failing to prevent the judges in his
office from testifying.
Much of the testimony of the Chicago judges centered on
O'Byme's supervisor, Theodore Haynes, who at the time was chief administrative
law judge for several Midwestern states known as Region V. One AU, Richard
F. Sprague, testified that a union offidal told him that Haynes, in an effort to
boost productivity figures for the Chicago West office, had ordered payment for
"a filing cabinet full" of Medicare cases without examining the record.
The union offidal denied he ever made such a statement, but
O'Byme signed an affidavit that he also heard him make the allegation. Five days
later, on September 6, 1990, "I was discharged on the phone by Ted Haynes,"
says O'Byrne. "I was removed not because of the operations of this office," he
alleges, "but because of Sprague's testimony in the House."
At last year's June 13 hearing, a number of judges daimed that
Social Security uses several punishments to increase productivity of judges.
Judge William Bonham of the Oak Park, Michigan, hearings office testified that
"AUs who do not meet the targets are assigned more difficult cases, assigned less
desirable travel dockets."
Those who meet the targets, however, are "assigned easier
cases, given more desirable travel assignments, allowed freedom to abuse
attendance standards, allowed to engage significantly in personal matters during
the weekday. Of course, no attempt is made to evaluate the professional quality
of the work."
Judge Dennis Runyan testified that Haynes threatened in 1989
to dose the Flint, Michigan, hearings office if each judge did not meet the goal
of scheduling 40 hearings and dedding 37 cases a month. Three other judges
submitted testimony that Haynes reduced the clerical staff for the Lansing,
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Michigan, office to six persons for five AUs, when the national average was five
clericals for one judge.
The problem with forcing Social Security judges to increase their
workload, says Earl Thomas, immediate-past chair of the National Conference of
Administrative Law Judges, is that AUs then are forced to depend on agency
decision writers, who are more likely to be influenced by the viewpoint of their
employer. 'The decision writers are supervised by agency personnel," he says.
'They know which side their bread is buttered on. You see the potential for
problems."
The three Lansing judges who testified at last year's hearing had
filed an action with the Merit Systems Protection Board in August 1989
challenging the workload goals and the reduced staffing. 'We asked that they,
in effect, cease and desist," says Allen C. Youngblood, one of the AU
complainants. The board held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case,
and in April the U.S. Court of Appeals for the federal Circuit affirmed.
Despite the setbacks on the judicial battleground, Youngblood
and the other Lansing AUs do have additional clerical help now. Social Security
authorized additional staff two months after the judges filed their initial complaint,
he says.
In a spirited telephone interview, Haynes denied that he
removed O'Byme because of the testimony by Sprague. "I was not pleased with
the way the office was functioning; I removed him," he says. 'There was no loss
of pay, no reassignment. He was simply taken out of the management structure.
That's been done by chief judges since the office was established."
Haynes, who is black, speculates that racism entered into
O'Byrne's criticism of his decision. He believes O'Byrne would not have
complained had he been removed by a white.
Haynes calls the story that he paid for a filing cabinet full of
cases "a categorical lie" and points out he was vindicated on this point by a
Government Accounting Office investigation. He also questions why Congress did
not invite him to testify at the June 13 hearing.
Haynes adds that he did not threaten to dose any Social
Security offices, but admits that he cut back on derical personnel at low-producing
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offices. "Staff was put in offices where the work was gotten out, he says. "I
think that's a wise management decision."
When he took over at Region V, Haynes says, the average
decision rate was 26 cases per judge each month. The average had increased
to 37 cases when he left in September 1989. "1 don't think I have to apologize
for that," he says. 'The reason these people [who testified] are so outraged is
that I made some judges get off their butts and work."
The criticisms voiced at last year's congressional hearing are only
the latest controversy plaguing Social Security.
When Social Security in October 1981 mandated agency review
of the decisions of all AUs who granted benefits in at least 70 percent of their
cases, an organization of Social Security AUs sued. U.S. District Judge Joyce Hens
Green said the review program could interfere with the AUs' independence, but,
because it was discontinued, she refused to grant an injunction. Assocation of
Administrative Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F.Supp. 1132.
One AU, Simon Nash, lost his challenge to several agency
policies in Nash v. Bovwen, 869 F.2d 675 (1989). The 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that Nash lacked standing to attack his employer's policy of non-
acquiescence in decisions of federal courts other than the Supreme Court. The
appeals court also upheld findings that AU independence was not hurt by
production goals or by the same review program challenged in Heckler.
Not all agree that there is a problem with agency control of
AUs. "I know of very few instances where allegations have been raised about
agency interference with AU independence," says Jeffrey Lubbers, research
director for the Administrative Conference of the United States. "Some agencies
are worse than others," adds NCAU's Thomas.
Both Thomas and Lubbers acknowledge that Social Security has
been the target of a greater number of complaints in the past. But, says Lubbers,
"I think SSA has changed some of their practices. You don't hear allegations
they're tring to affect case outcome anymore. You do hear allegations from
some of the judges that they have to meet goals that they feel may be in general
a little too high."
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Many of the complaints about goals "are from judges who are
very low producers or who, in addition to productivity claims against them, have
conduct claims against them," adds Alan Heifetz, chief administrative law judge
at the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
The ABA has proposed a solution to the problem of agency
control-create an independent corps of administrative law judges. Sen. Howell
Heflin, D-Aa., first introduced a corps bill in the Senate in 1982. His latest
proposal, S.826, was introduced on April 16, 1991.
Under the bill, judges would be grouped in eight divisions,
according to their expertise. The corps would assign judges to hear cases at the
request of the agencies. Judges occasionally could hear cases outside their
division of expertise, however.
Craig Baab, former staff director for the ABA Governmental
Affairs Office, says AUs who are employed by a corps 'Would be insulated
somewhat from the influence of political appointees and others in the various
federal agencies who may lean on them to decide a case one way or another."
Another benefit, says Thomas, is that caseload would be
assigned more evenly. Under the current system, some agencies have a case
backlog, while the workload is lighter at others. And, since judges would be
dispersed throughout the country, they no longer would have to travel to hear
cases.
A third benefit is the money that could be saved by eliminating
duplicative facilities and staff. For example, Thomas says, if the Washington, D.C.,
offices of AUs could be grouped in one organization, support staff could be
pooled and libraries consolidated.
Heifetz, however, is not convinced that a corps would result in
any savings. Administrative duties that are now performed by the agendes-such
as payroll, travel and computer services-would have to be moved to the new
corps. "It would be the largest adjudicatory system in the world," he says. 'You
create a super bureaucracy."
Heifetz also supports some agency oversight. 'You can't have
a judge be totally unaccountable to anyone, sitting in his chambers and
ruminating on a decision for months on end."
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Another lawyer also cautions against giving AUs too much
independence. 'We're wrestling with how to deal with judges who are patently
unfair, while still trying to make sure they have enough independence so they can
act as judges without fear of agency interference," says Richard Weishaupt of
Community Legal Services of Philadelphia.
His legal-aid group filed a petition with Social Security to remove
an AU who allegedly screamed at daimants, refused to admit relevant testimony,
and mischaracterized evidence in the record. The petition was denied, but the
agency did require remedial training for the judge. More outrageous is the
allegation that an AU in Florida asked a daimant to pull down his pants so the
judge could personally examine his daimed injury.
The solution, says Weishaupt, is to establish a complaint process
"driven by daimants." The judge could be reviewed, for example, by a peer panel
or through a process established by the Administrative Conference of the United
States. "I don't think there's a simple prescription," he says. "But there are ways
to police judges who act in totally absurd ways."
